Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions by Belzil, Christian
Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions
Christian Belzil
To cite this version:
Christian Belzil. Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions. Working paper GATE 2007-17.
2007. <halshs-00174524>
HAL Id: halshs-00174524
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00174524
Submitted on 24 Sep 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groupe d’An
Éc
UMR 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAI
 
 
W.P. 0
  
Subjective Beliefs and 
 
 
 Christian
 
 
 
 
Juin 2
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et
UMR 5824 d
93 chemin des Mouilles –
B.P. 167 – 69131
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – 
Messagerie électroniqu
Serveur Web : ww
 
 
  
 
GATE 
alyse et de Théorie 
onomique 
5824 du CNRS L - WORKING PAPERS 
7-17 
Schooling Decisions 
 Belzil 
007 
 de Théorie Économique 
u CNRS 
 69130 Écully – France 
 Écully Cedex 
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
e gate@gate.cnrs.fr
w.gate.cnrs.fr 
Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions∗
Christian Belzil
Centre de National de Recherche Scientifique,
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
and CIRANO
June 9, 2007
∗I thank Robert Miller, Christian Gourieroux, Robert Sauer, Elena Pastorino, Robin
Mason, Jean Marc Robin, David Huﬀman, David Margolies, Marco Leonardi and semi-
nar participants at Southampton, Milano, GATE (Lyon) and Paris School of Economics
(Pantheon-Sorbonne) for helpul comments and discussions.
1
Abstract
This paper considers the estimation of sequential schooling decisions made
by agents who are endowed with subjective beliefs about their own ability. I
use unique Italian panel data which provide information on i) the curvature
of the per-period utility function, ii) schooling decisions, iii) post-schooling
earnings, in order to estimate the future component of the diﬀerences in in-
tertemporal utilities of school and work independently from the present com-
ponent, (as in Geweke and Keane, 1995, 2001), and evaluate the importance
of “present bias”. Under certain conditions, which include imposing equal-
ity between the modal belief and true ability, I recover individual specific
subjective probability distributions. I estimate both the degree of confidence
(a measure of spread) and the incidence of over (and under) estimation. I
find that the future component of intertemporal utilities dominates schooling
decisions. I find a strong incidence of under-estimation among the more able
and a much smaller incidence of over-estimation among the low ability group.
At the medium ability spectrum, there is evidence of some over-estimation.
The degree of confidence is high and imply that agents have a substantial
amount of inside information (36% of the population act on a degenerate
subjective distribution). Overall, the variance of the objective ability het-
erogeneity distribution is 4 times as large the variance of the distribution
characterizing subjective beliefs.
JEL Classification: J24.
Key Words: Subjective distributions, Expectation Parameterization, Ra-
tional Expectation, Schooling, Dynamic programming, Present bias, Over-
Confidence.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers the estimation of optimal (sequential) schooling deci-
sions made within an imperfect information framework. Imperfections arise
for two main reasons. First, agents have imperfect information about their
abilities in the labor market and are endowed with a subjective probability
distribution that characterizes their beliefs. This distribution is taken as
exogenous. A second form of imperfection arises because agents may have
subjective beliefs about future earnings random shocks that diverge from the
objective distribution of post-schooling earnings1
The approach to estimation proposed herein is in the spirit of Geweke
and Keane (1995, 2001). I use unique Italian panel data which provide in-
formation on i) the curvature of the per-period utility function, ii) schooling
decisions, iii) post-schooling earnings, in order to estimate the future com-
ponent of the diﬀerences in intertemporal utilities of school and work inde-
pendently from the present component. Because the form of the per-period
utility is known (the risk aversion parameter), the information about the cur-
vature of the per-period utility function enters both the current utility and
the future utility components separately. The separation between present
and future components implies that I can estimate the degree of “present
bias” in schooling decisions.2
Under certain conditions, which include imposing equality between the
modal belief and true ability, I can recover individual specific subjective abil-
ity distributions. This has two immediate implications. First, I can estimate
the location parameter of the subjective distribution and investigate the ac-
curacy of subjective beliefs. This leads to the measurement of the incidence
of over (or under) estimation. Second, the dispersion of the subjective ability
distribution allows me to evaluate the degree of confidence of the agents (as
measured by the variance of the subjective beliefs). In turn, the ratio of
the variance of the objective heterogeneity distribution (from the perspec-
tive of the econometrician) over the variance of subjective beliefs may be
informative about the degree of inside information held by agents (over the
1Because I do not model how subjective distributions are inferred, the model is not
necessarily inconsistent with a standard rational expectation framework.
2This also implies that I can determine if young individuals perceive schooling as a form
of insurance or as a risky asset. However, this issue (and other surrounding querstions) are
investigated in a companion paper (Belzil and Leonardi, 2007). For this reason, I ignore
the link between risk and education in this paper.
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econometrician). The analysis proposed herein may therefore be viewed as a
generalization of the notion of “Overconfidence” that has recently gained in
popularity. Finally, note that the degree of confidence is also a measure of
ex-ante risk caused by the ignorance that agents may have about their own
abilities.3
The empirical results display 6 major findings.
1. At all grade levels, both the average values and the degree of disper-
sion of the future component of the intertemporal utilities exceed the
equivalent measure for the present component. The predominance of
future components in schooling decisions, seem to be supportive of the
standard time consistent model. However, at the same time, idiosyn-
cratic utility shocks appear to be an important determinant of schooling
decisions.
2. These is a high degree of heterogeneity in subjective beliefs, but it is
explained mostly by the importance of heterogeneity in the objective
ability distribution (identified from panel data). Subjective beliefs are
found to be quite accurate on average (within-type dispersion is small).
3. Precisely, 36% of the population is found to take decisions based on a
degenerate ability distribution.
4. I find a strong incidence of under-estimation among the more able but a
small incidence of over-estimation among the low ability group. At the
medium ability spectrum, there is evidence of some over-estimation.
5. Defining the degree of confidence as the ratio of the variance of the ob-
jective distribution (as perceived by the econometrician) to the variance
of the subjective distribution, would lead to a degree approximately
equal to 4. In other words, only 25% of unobserved ability heterogene-
ity is actually perceived as ex-ante risk. The degree of confidence is high
and imply that agents have a substantial amount of inside information.
6. Both the level of ex-ante risk (the degree of non-confidence) and the
degree of inaccuracy (the incidence of either under-estimation or over-
estimation) are increasing with market ability.
3The importance of distinguishing between ex-ante risk and heterogeneity (or inequal-
ity) is made forcefully in Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005).
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The remaining sections of the paper are structured according to the fol-
lowing format. In Section 2, I discuss the motivation and some background
literature. Section 3 describes the model. The Bank of Italy Survey of In-
come andWealth (SHIW) is presented in Section 4. All assumptions required
to implement the model are laid out in Section 5. In Section 6, I discuss how
risk aversion is measured. Section 7 is devoted to issues surrounding iden-
tification and estimation. In Section 8, I briefly outline the presentation of
the structural parameters. In Section 9, I discuss the relative importance of
present and future components. In Section 10, I present the results charac-
terizing the objective ability distribution. In Section 11, I discuss a set of
issues (over and under estimation, confidence) related to subjective beliefs.
A brief summary of results is reported in Section 12. The Conclusion is in
Section 13.
2 Motivation and Background literature
The structural literature concerned with dynamic models of human capital
accumulation has expanded rapidly in the past 10 years. There are good rea-
sons for that. Structural models provide a transparent illustration of several
dynamic self-selection issues which are central to the analysis of education
and skill formation policies. Perhaps more importantly, the structural ap-
proach provides the only econometric framework which enables the researcher
to distinguish the determinants of ex ante decisions from ex-post outcomes.
To achieve this, those who have estimated dynamic models have relied in-
variably on various forms of the “Rational Expectation” (RE) hypothesis.4
Dynamic rational expectation models are based on the assumption that
agents use available information eﬃciently. At a practical level, the RE
hypothesis implies a coincidence between subjective probabilities used by
the agent and the objective distribution that generates observable outcomes
such as endogenous state variables (the law of motion) or random shocks.
The RE hypothesis is therefore a powerful identifying restriction.5 Because
4In the structural literature on schooling decisions, Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein
andWolpin, 1999, Belzil and Hansen, 2002, and Heckman and Navarro (2006) are examples
of dynamic rational expectations models. The literature is surveyed in Belzil (2007).
5There is indeed a relatively wide literature on identification of dynamic discrete
choices. See Rust (1994), Magnac and Thesmar (2002), and more recently, Heckman and
Navarro (2006).
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the agent knows the objective distribution of interest, the econometrician
may infer the distribution of stochastic shocks (and the law of motion) from
data, and use it in order to solve the dynamic program faced by the agent.6
In many applications, the RE hypothesis involves more than the distribu-
tion of idiosyncratic random shocks. If there are time invariant state variables
unobserved to the econometrician (what is usually referred to as unobserved
heterogeneity), it is customary to maintain the assumption that individuals
know their values from the beginning of the horizon, even though some of
these variables may turn out to be realized at a later stage in the like cycle.7
In the schooling literature, this implies that labor market ability is known
before entering the labor market.8
While the RE hypothesis is convenient, its empirical justification is rarely
discussed. In his insightful criticism of the rational expectation hypothesis
in micro-econometric models, Manski (2004) argues against the capacity of
agents to form subjective beliefs that are consistent with actual outcomes
based on the lack of agreement among micro-econometricians on a proper
inference method.9 Manski’s criticisms may appear particularly relevant in
the context where risk averse agents make optimal schooling decisions. Mea-
suring the relationship between attitudes toward risk and educational choices
is a long standing problem in labor economics. This is partly due to the fact
that quantifying the marginal risk which characterizes the transition from
one level of schooling to the next is much harder than evaluating the relative
riskiness of various financial assets.
Not surprisingly, the controversial nature of the RE hypothesis has pushed
many econometricians to suggest obtaining direct measures of subjective
6In more extreme cases, such as in Rust’s 1987 seminal piece on engine replacement, the
random shocks is assumed to follow an extreme value distribution (with no free parameter)
and the econometrician does not even need to use data on outcomes.
7To my knowledge, the first micro econometric model that allows for subjective beliefs
about ability and/or tastes is Miller (1994). Miller estimates a matching model (Jovanovic,
1979) of occupation choice in which dynamics arise because of learning about a match
specific reward.
8In a certain sense, perfect knowledge of one’s abilities in the labor market requires a
form of perfect foresight.
9Obviously, the RE hypothesis is also diﬃcult to maintain outside equilibrium, or
in the presence of potential technological changes. In the presence of search friction,
persistent individual eﬀects identified in earnings panel data would also be aﬀected by
firm heterogeneity. By construction, it would be impossible for any agent to know these
factors ex-ante.
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probability distributions, from various forms of elicitations. This literature
is examined in Manski (2004).10 While using actual data on beliefs would
always be a dominant strategy, such data are rarely available. For this rea-
son, it is particularly important to design an estimation method that may
work in a context where agents have imperfect knowledge about their abil-
ities and where econometricians do not have access to data on beliefs and
expectations11. This is indeed the main objective of this paper.
However, the contributions are not solely located to the econometric lit-
erature on the estimation of dynamic discrete choices. The method that I
propose in this paper is quite diﬀerent from the usual structural strategy.
It builds on a method proposed by Geweke and Keane (1995, 2001).12 Be-
cause the estimation method decomposes sequential choices into three sep-
arate components (present utility, future utility, and utility shocks) which
are freely estimated, I can evaluate the relative importance of the future in
schooling decisions. This is a second objective, and it is an important issue.
Standard structural (dynamic) estimation usually requires to posit a para-
metric family for the utility function (or other primitive objects) as well as
all the probability distributions that characterize the subjective beliefs of the
agents. The future component of the intertemporal utility of a specific choice
is a by-product of the model structure. However, in recent years, the validity
of intertemporal expected utility models has been the object of debates be-
tween Behavioral economists and proponents of the expected utility theory.
More precisely, the existence of “present biased” behavior has been put for-
ward as a challenge to conventional time consistent intertemporal models.13
A second objective is to contribute to the debate between behavioral econo-
mists and proponents of the classical intertemporal models. I can do so by
evaluating the relative importance of the future in schooling decisions.
A third objective is to evaluate both the degree of accuracy and the
10See Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest (2005) for a recent example.
11In the behavioral economics literature, it is common to elicit beliefs within labora-
tory experiments. However, the extrapolation of laboratory outcomes to actual lifecycle
decisions may sometimes be viewed as controversial.
12As far as I know, the Geweke-Keane approach (a form of expectation parameterization)
has not been used widely by microeconometricians. However, it has been applied in an
experimental framework by Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004).
13The literature on Hyperbolic discounting, which has emerged in the past 10 years,
is perhaps the best example. Rubinstein (2005) present a good exposition of the major
theoretical issues that are at sake in the current debate between behavioral economists
and proponents of the more classical approach.
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degree of confidence (dispersion) that characterize subjective ability evalu-
ations. This allows me to link another segment of the behavioral literature
with the literature on dynamic discrete choices. In recent years, the notion
of “over-confidence” has attracted much attention. It has been used in order
to explain financial market behavior, and has also been analyzed in various
laboratory experiments. As of now, over-confidence has been used mostly as
a relative notion (using individual’s own subjective ranking within a bench-
mark distribution in comparison with the individuals’ actual ranking), but it
has not been analyzed in a formal structural context.14 Interestingly, most
application seem to consider over-confidence in a degenerate context, in which
ex-ante risk (about ability) plays no role.15 As the approach suggested herein
relies on estimation a full distribution of beliefs, I can distinguish between the
degree of accuracy (under-estimation and over-estimation) and the degree of
confidence (the level of ex-ante dispersion in the individual specific parame-
ter). Ultimately, the approach I suggest generalizes the popular notion of
over-confidence.
Finally, because the model distinguishes ex-ante beliefs from ex-post dis-
tributions (identified from panel data), a fourth objective is to contribute
to the recent literature on the measurement of the degree of ex-ante risk
and its comparison with cross-sectional heterogeneity which appears to be
the central empirical measure motivation the literature on income or wage
inequality.16
.
3 The Model
In this section, I present a simple theoretical model of schooling choices. The
control variable, dt, is equal to S when the individual chooses to continue
in school, and to W when entering the labor market is chosen. The level of
schooling completed by at the beginning of each period, denoted j, may take
j = 1, 2, ..J values. While it would be possible to equate time (t) with grade
level (j), I keep a separate time index. Finally, it is important to note that in
14Camerer and Lovello (1999) is a classical reference.
15Obviously, this does not mean that other aspects of the experiments do not involve
risk.
16See Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005).
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the presentation we distinguish between subjective probability distributions,
denoted by µ(.), and objective distributions, denoted by F (.).
3.1 The Utility of Attending School
The per-period utility of attending school for an individual i, at time t, and
who has already completed grade level j, USit (j), is
USit(j) = φ{ISi (j);αi}+ εSit(j) (1)
where
ISi (j) = θ
S
i + I¯
S
i (j) (2)
and where
• φ(, ;αi) is the deterministic part of the utility function, αi is an indi-
vidual specific parameter that indicates the degree of curvature.
• Ii(j) is the net individual income while school (in grade j). I¯(j) may
capture the eﬀect of institutional features on the cost (or utility) of
being in grade j.
• θSi is individual specific taste/ability aﬀecting net income17 It is known
by the agent.
• εSit(j) is a random utility shock aﬀecting the utility of attending grade
level j.18
3.2 Labor market income
Labor market income is stochastic. It is expressed as:
IWit (j) = I¯
W (j) + θWi + ε
W
it (j) (3)
where εWit (j) is a random shock, which distribution may depend on grade
level. It is discussed in details below. The term θWi represents individual
specific market ability (it is unobserved to the econometrician). The per-
period utility of work will be introduced below, after having defined clearly
the information set of the agent.
17It is common to refer to θi as the true psychic costs of attending school.
18Another way to proceed would be to assume income while income in school as sto-
chastic.
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3.3 Individual Persistent Abilities
In order to solve the problem, young individuals must form a subjective
probability distribution of θWi . I am agnostic about its determination. It
could be understood as a belief conditional on θSi or/and on an individual
specific vector of family background variables (Xi). It is denoted µθW (.).
19
It may correspond to a formal inference process that use wages and abilities
(school and labor market) of individuals who belong to a diﬀerent (older)
cohort.
3.4 Present and Future Earnings Random shocks
I assume young individuals do not know the stochastic shock aﬀecting labor
market income when the decision between school and work is exercised. It
may be justified if, for instance, new entrants have to invest in search ac-
tivities. Because εWit (j), reflects the status of the labor market at time t
(for an individual with grade level j), it is reasonable to assume that agents
know the actual (objective) distribution F (εwit).The subjective probability
distributions over future outcomes is denoted µFt (j). It represents the sub-
jective beliefs about all (relevant) future random shocks aﬀecting earnings,
but also random components aﬀecting job search, career changes, training
(or re-training) opportunities or the incidence of technological change, which
are formed at time t. It is not necessarily equal to its corresponding objec-
tive distribution. Obviously, it may (and should) depend on grade level (j)
since agents may believe that the higher moments of the random shocks are
aﬀected by accumulated schooling. At this stage, µFt (.) is left unspecified.
3.5 Information Set and Timing of Decisions
I now define the information set of individual i, at time t, which is denotedΩit.
Because I focus on schooling decisions, I consider periods that precede labor
market entrance. The information set, Ωit, contains the following elements:
Ωit = {j, εSit(j), I¯Si (j), θSi , Xi} (4)
where Xi is an individual specific vector of family attributes. The timing of
the decision is therefore the following. Upon entering period t with grade
19Formally, it should be denoted µθ(θ
W
i | θSi ,Xi) but I use µθW (.) to avoid cumbersome
notation.
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level j already completed, individuals observe the utility shock (εSit). Then,
they decide on entering the labor market or completing an additional grade
level, based on θSi , F (.), µ
F
t (.) and µθW (.).
3.6 The Utility of work
From the expected utility paradigm, the expected utility of entering the labor
market (with completed grade level j) is:
UWit (j) = Eφ[I
W
i,t (j);F (ε
w
it), µθW (.)] =
Z Z
φ[IWi,t (j)]dF (ε
w
it)dµθW (.) (5)
where the double integral reflects uncertainty about both the present earnings
shock and labor market ability.
3.7 Value Functions
Using grade level (j) as the only conditioning state variable, the intertempo-
ral utility of entering grade j + 1 (with grade jcompleted), V St (j), is
V St (j) = φ{ISi (j)}+εSit(j)+βE(MaxV st+1(j+1), V wt+1(j+1);µFt (), µθW (.)) (6)
which entails taking expectation over future random shocks (µFt ()) and over
subjective ability beliefs (µθW (.)). To reduce notational burden, I re-express
V St (j) as
V St (j) = U
S
it(j) + βEVt+1(j + 1) (7)
Assuming that work is an absorbing state, the value function of work,
V Wt (j), is
V Wt (j) = Eφ[I
W
it (j);F (ε
w
it(j)), µθW (.)] + βEV
W
t+1(j;µ
F
t (.), µθW (.)) (8)
which I also re-express as
V Wt (j) = U
W
it (j) + βEV
W
t+1(j) (9)
The future component of the expected utility of work may include the
option of taking a wide variety of actions (job search, career changes, training
(or re-training) opportunities), which are not modeled explicitly.
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4 The Bank of Italy Survey of Income and
Wealth (SHIW)
The data come from the 1995 wave of the Bank of Italy Survey of Income and
Wealth (SHIW). The survey collects information on consumption, income
and wealth in addition to several household characteristics for a representa-
tive sample of 8,135 Italian households. More importantly, the 1995 survey
contains a question on household willingness to pay for a lottery which can
be used to build a measure of individual risk attitudes. 20
Apart from the lottery question, I use information on the level of edu-
cation attained by the head of household, as well as variables such as age,
gender, region of birth, parental education and parental occupation. This set
of variables is comparable to those which are used in US studies based on the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS). I select the sample of all heads with a
valid answer to the lottery question (3,458) and eliminate those who report
a missing value in any of the following variables: education, age, gender, re-
gion of birth, education and occupation of the head’s father and mother. This
selection process leaves us with a final sample of 3,288 heads of household.
The schooling variable takes values for 1 to 6 corresponding to no ed-
ucation, elementary school (typically attained at 11 years of age), junior
high school (attained at 14), high school (attained at 18), university degree
(attained at 23-24) and post-university degree. The data include schooling
attainment (no qualification,elementary school, lower high school, upper high
school and higher education) and panel data on post schooling labor market
earnings.
The vector of family background variables (Xi) contains a set of education
binary indicators equal to 1 the father and the mother have reached higher
education (FED = 1,MED = 1) and a set of occupation indicators equal
to 1 when they are classified as white collar worker (FWC = 1,MWC = 1).
The data also provide information on gender and geographic region of birth
(North, Center and South). These are summarized in a vector denoted Zi.
As will be clear later, In order to identify subjective beliefs, post-schooling
20Guiso and Paiella (2005), use the question on risk aversion to analyze occupation
choice, portfolio selection, insurance demand, investment in education (in the linear OLS
case) and migration decisions. They find substantial eﬀects of this measure of risk aversion
in ways that are consistent with the theory i.e. that more risk averse individuals choose
lower returns in exchange for lower risk.
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panel data on earnings are crucial. In the SHIW, I observe a maximum of 7
post-schooling earnings (1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002). Earnings
are measured on a yearly basis, and are set in euros. Sample statistics are
found in Appendix.
5 Empirical Implementation
In this section, I document all explicit assumptions that are needed in order
to estimate the model. There are four main four components; unobserved
heterogeneity, the distribution of the random shocks, the specification of the
future component, and the subjective and objective probability distributions.
5.1 Preferences
I assume that
φ(Ii(j);αi) = − exp(−αi · Ii(j)) (10)
where αi is an individual specific parameter that measures the degree of
absolute risk aversion. Risk aversion (loving) is obtained when αi exceeds (is
below) 0.
5.2 The Earnings Equation
There are 5 levels of education attainable by the individual. These levels are
no qualification (level 1), elementary school (level 2), junior high school (level
3), Senior high school (level 4 ) and higher education (level 5).21 I allow
for non-linearities in the returns to schooling by using level specific dummy
variables. I assume that
IWi,j = θ
W
i + ζ
W
j · Level(j) + ζ6 · exp+ζ7 · exp2+εWit (j) for j = 1, 2..5 (11)
and
ISi,j = θ
S
i + ζ
S
j · Level(j) for j = 1, 2..5 (12)
21I group those who report having completed graduate studies with those who have a
university degree because their number is too small to form a distinct class.
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where the ζW 0j s and the ζ
S0
j s are parameters to be estimated. The binary
variables, Level(j), are equal to 1 when individual ihas reached level jand 0
if not. More details about θWi and θ
S
i are found below.
5.3 The Distribution of Random Shocks
In order to minimize the impact of distributional assumptions, I approximate
the density of the earnings shocks with a mixture of M unrestricted normal
densities and the distribution the utility shocks with a mixture of M normal
distribution functions. Precisely,
F (εSit) =
MX
m=1
P Sm · Φ(µSm, σSm). (13)
where PSm is the mixing probability and Φ(µm, σm) denotes the normal cu-
mulative distribution function, and
F (εWit ) =
MX
m=1
PWm · φ(µWm , σWm ). (14)
where PWm is the mixing probability and φ(µm, σm) denotes the normal den-
sity. More details concerning are provided in Appendix 4.
5.4 Ability Heterogeneity, Parents Background and Sep-
arability
Both θWi and θ
S
i are decomposed into a separable regression component that
depends on parents background variables and an orthogonal component.
That is
θSi = θ
S
1 · FED + θS2 ·MED + θS3 · FWC + θS4 ·MWC + θSZ · Zi + θ˜
S
i (15)
θWi = θ
W
1 ·FED+θW2 ·MED+θW3 ·FWC+θW4 ·MWC+θWZ ·Zi+ θ˜
W
i (16)
where θSZ and θ
W
Z are parameters associated to the socio economic variables.
I assume that agents are capable to infer the eﬀects of parents’ background
on θWi . In order to solve the dynamic programming problem, they must solely
generate a subjective belief about θ˜
W
i . This separability assumption will play
a key role in the specification of the subjective beliefs.
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5.5 The Objective Probability Distribution of Abilities
The population is composed of 6 types of individuals. Each type is endowed
with a vector of relevant parameters (θ˜
W
i , θ˜
S
i ). The market ability term takes
three values; θ˜
W
H (the highest value), θ˜
W
M (the medium value) and θ˜
W
L (the
lowest value). The school ability term takes 2 values: θ˜
S
H and θ˜
S
L. The six
types are generated by all combinations possible of θ˜
W
i and θ˜
S
i . The typology
of the objective ability distribution is as follows:
Type Market (θ˜
W
i ) School (θ˜
S
i )
n = 1 High High
n = 2 High low
n = 3 Medium High
n = 4 Medium Low
n = 5 Low high
n = 6 low Low
The (objective) type probabilities, Pr(type n), are estimated using logistic
transform. That is
Pr(type n) =
exp(ωn)
1 + exp(ω1) + ... exp(ω5)
(17)
where the ωn0s are parameters to be estimated.
5.6 The Subjective Beliefs about Market Ability
In order to estimate the model, I must first specify the subjective probabilities
of the agent. Each type (objective) of individual is endowed with a diﬀerent
set of subjective type probabilities. By this, I mean probabilities of being
of type H, type M and type L. This heterogeneity may arise for several
reasons. Individuals may use their inside information about θSi to predict
θWi . An alternative hypothesis is that individuals with diﬀerent abilities may
use available information diﬀerently, and therefore be endowed with diﬀerent
subjective probabilities..
For an individual of type n, the subjective beliefs (or the set of subjective
probabilities) are
15
µθw(type n) =
{Pr(θ˜Wi = θ˜
W
H | type n),Pr(θ˜
W
i = θ˜
W
M | type n),Pr(θ˜
W
i = θ˜
W
L | type n)}
= {pHn, pMn, pLn} (18)
where each probability is specified as a logistic distribution;
pln =
exp(µnl )
1 + exp(µnl )
for l = H,M,L and j = 1, 2, ..6 (19)
where µnl is a parameter to be estimated. Identification is addressed below.
5.7 The Present and Future Components of the In-
tertemporal Utility
5.7.1 The Present Component
The type-specific per-period utility (expected) of entering the labor market
with schooling level j, Eφ[IWit (j);F (ε
w
it), µθW (.) | type n] is:
X
l=H,M,L
pln · {−
MX
m=1
p∗m · exp(−αi · (δj + θ˜
W
l ) +
α2i .σ
2
m
2
)} = hn(j) (20)
and the type specific diﬀerence in present utilities (the present component of
the intertemporal utility), P n(j), is
P n(j) = hn(j)− φ(I(j)) (21)
5.7.2 Future component
To estimate the model, I must posit the form of the future component of the
diﬀerence between the utility of work and the utility of attending school. The
future component is to be understood as a weighted average of conditional
future component (for each possible pair (θ˜
W
i , θ˜
S
i )). It represents the future
component of the intertemporal utility of an individual with a given school
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ability type and a given (perhaps counterfactual) market ability type. How-
ever, it is defined under the maintained assumption that all individual (all
types) share a common belief about post-schooling random shocks µFt (.).I
denote the conditional future component by zkl(j), where the index k iden-
tifies the school ability type (H or L), the index l identifies labor market
ability type (H,M,L), and where j is again grade level. It is given by the
following expression
zkl(j) = z0klj +z1klj · αi +z2klj · FED +z3klj ·MED + (22)
z4klj · FWC ·z5klj ·MWC +z6klj · Zi
where all the z0kljs are parameters to be estimated. The parameter z0klj
plays the role of a heterogeneity term for each school and market ability
type and grade level combinations.22 In words, zkl(j) is the diﬀerence in
future components of value functions for a given level of school ability and
a potential level of market ability. As opposed to the conditional future
component, the type specific future component depends on the actual type
simply because each type is endowed with its own subjective beliefs.
The type specific future component, z¯nj(.), is therefore equal to
z¯n(j) = pHn ·zkH(j) + pMn ·zkM(j) + pLn ·zkL(j) (23)
Note that the separate estimation of the future component from the
present component implies that the marginal eﬀect of the curvature of the
per-period utility function (the degree of risk aversion αi) on future expected
utility of attending school is freely estimated.
6 Measuring Risk Aversion
In the survey, each head of household is asked to report the maximum price
he/she is willing to pay to participate to an hypothetical lottery. The ques-
tion is worded as follows:
“We would now like to ask you a hypothetical question that we would
like you to answer as if the situation was a real one. You are oﬀered the
opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probability,
22I impose an additive (as opposed to multiplicative) heterogeneity term in order to
minimize the number of parameters.
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either to gain a net amount of 10 million lire (roughly 5,000 dollars) or to
lose all the capital invested. What is the most you are prepared to pay
for this security?”23 The respondent can answer in three possible ways: 1)
give the maximum price he/she is willing to pay, which we denote as bet;
2) don’t know; 3) don’t want to participate. In total, 3,458 answered they
were willing to participate and reported a positive maximum price they were
willing to bet (prices equal to zero are not considered a valid response). The
valid responses to the question - bet - range from 1,000 lire to 100 million lire
and constitute our measure of individual risk aversion. Of the 3,288 heads
for whom I have access to parents background variables, 3,131 reported a
maximum price bet less than 10 million lire which implies that they are risk
averse individuals, 117 reported bet exactly equal to 10 million lire (i.e. they
are risk neutral) and 40 reported bet more than 10 million indicating that
they are risk lovers. The empirical distribution of bet is reported in Appendix
1B. Although the majority of the respondents are risk averse and only 5% of
the sample is either risk-neutral or risk-loving, there is a large heterogeneity
in the degree of risk aversion within the risk averse individuals which shows
that preferences are very heterogenous with respect to risk.
In general, the optimal bet depends on Ui(.) and on consumer endow-
ment (wi).To obtain a measure of risk aversion, I use the one-to-one corre-
spondence between the value attached to the lottery, and the degree of risk
aversion (given wealth). Given the static (single period) nature of the lottery,
I assume that the per-period utility function, along with the value of the bet,
is suﬃcient uncover the degree of risk aversion.
In the applied literature, it is common to rely on a Taylor series expansion
of the expected utility equation of a lottery for a small risk.24 In such a case,
it is easy to express the Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion (the degree
of absolute risk aversion) in terms of the parameters of the lottery. Such
a measure is indeed available in the SHIW. However, in this paper, I use a
more direct approach. As is usually the case in structural analysis, I assume a
particular parametric form for the per-period utility. This implies that I may
re-interpret the maximum bet oﬀered by a given individual as the solution
23In other words, the expected value of entering the lottery is 0.5 · (10, 000, 000− bet).
Guiso and Paiella (2004) write that the interviews were conducted by professional inter-
viewers at the respondents’ homes and to help the respondent to understand the question
the interviewers showed them an illustrative card and were ready to provide explanations.
24For more discussion, see Gollier (2001).
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to the following equation;
1
2
φi(wi + g;αi) +
1
2
φi(wi − beti, αi) = φi(wi, αi) (24)
Using the restriction that U(x) = − exp(−αi · x), it is easy to solve for the
degree of risk aversion; that is to find an individual specific parameter αi
which is uniquely determined by the value of the bet and the gain
αi = α(beti, wi) (25)
To do so, I use a simple Gauss-Newton algorithm.25 The results reported in
Table 2 indicate that, on average, Italian heads of households are risk averse
(the average value of αi is 0.14). The degree of risk aversion ranges between
and 0.18 and -0.13. The data indicate that 98% of the sample is characterized
by risk aversion.
7 Identification and Estimation
In the structural econometric literature, identification is typically consid-
ered within a particular parametric structure.26 The structural literature on
schooling and human capital is no exception. In most applications, preference
heterogeneity is allowed through heterogeneity in the costs (or the monetary
equivalent utility) of schooling and the joint distribution of school and market
abilities is inferred from schooling attainments and post-schooling earnings
panel data. Diﬀerences in the curvature of the utility function are typically
ignored27 This is not the case in the present model. While I have observa-
25In order to check the validity of the absolute risk aversion measure used by most of
the SHIW users, I computed the correlation between the exact solution to the non-linear
equations and the taylor-series expansion approximation. As the correlation was found to
be only 0.10, I disregarded the use of the measure obtained from a Taylor series expansion.
26The common view is that structural models require to specify preferences and tech-
nology and therefore imply functional forms and parametric assumptions. The degree of
under-identification (non-parametric) is analyzed precisely in Rust (1994) and Magnac and
Thesmar (2002) although all of them consider the identification of generic models in which
data on outcomes are ignored. Heckman and Navarro (2006) show that non-parametric
identification may be obtained in certain type of dynamic structural model, with optimal
stopping properties.
27This is the case, for instance, in Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999) and Belzil and Hansen (2002). The typical identification procedure characterizing
the structural literature on schooling is surveyed in Belzil (2007).
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tion on the individual specific degree of curvature of the utility function, I
do not have data on the earnings while in school (the argument of the util-
ity function of attending school) and, furthermore, schooling decisions are
aﬀected by a supplementary source of heterogeneity caused by individual
specific subjective probability distributions. This is one aspect of identifi-
cation that has to be tackled. A second one arises because I assume that
parents’ background variables do not only aﬀect observable components (like
labor market earnings), but also aﬀect two distinct unobservable components;
namely the present and the future components of the schooling choice deter-
minants. To get around this fundamental degree of under-identification (and
obtain parametric) identification, some restrictions have to be imposed.
7.1 Identifying Restrictions
• Assumption 1- Parameter Space restrictions. Consistent with the
high level of intergenerational education correlation reported in the
literature, I assume that i) the diﬀerence between the future compo-
nent of the intertemporal utility of work and the intertemporal utility
of school must be decreasing with family education and that ii) both
school and market ability increase with parents’education. This en-
sures that those coming from more educated background must be more
likely to obtain higher education. This restricts the parameter space of
z1klj,z2klj,z3klj and z4klj to negative values and the parameter space
of θW1 , θ
W
2 , θ
W
3 and θ
W
4 as well as θ
S
1 , θ
S
2 , θ
S
3 and θ
S
4 to positive values.
• Assumption 2-Common Support points: I assume that the sup-
port points (θ˜
W
H , θ˜
W
M , θ˜
W
L ) of the subjective market ability distribution,
µθw(.), coincide with the support points of the objective probability
distribution .
• Assumption 3- Modal belief and actual type: I impose that indi-
viduals have suﬃcient information about their actual market ability so
to construct subjective beliefs that assign a higher probability of being
their actual type than each probability of being of being a counter-
factual type28 This entails forcing equality between the actual market
ability type and the mode of the subjective distribution. For the more
28This is not the only identifying restriction which is feasible. An alternative strategy
would be to restrict subjective probabilities across types.
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(less) able, the subjective probabilities are monotonically decreasing
(increasing) from θ˜
W
H to θ˜
W
L . Precisely, I assume that
pH1 > pM1 > pL1 (26)
pH2 > pM2 > pL2
pM3 > max{pH3, pL3}
pM4 > max{pH4, pL4}
pH5 < pM5 < pL5
pH6 < pM6 < pL6
In order to implement these inequality restrictions, it is suﬃcient to re-
strict the parameter space of the elements inside the logistic transform of the
subjective probabilities. Details are found in the Appendix
• Assumption 4- Common Belief: I assume that all individual (all
types) share a common belief about post-schooling random shocks
µFt (.). This allows me to focus solely on beliefs regrading ability.
7.2 Estimation Method
The probability of continuing from one grade level (j) to the next (j + 1),
Pr(j, t) is
Pr(j, t) = Pr[εSit(j) > h
n(j) + z¯n(j)] (27)
It is straightforward to form the likelihood function for an individual who has
reached level j∗, and has experienced a series of post-schooling earnings (..)
The contribution to the likelihood for the schooling attainment j∗ is denoted
L1, and is
L1 = Π
j∗−1
j=1 (Pr(j, t)) · (1− Pr(j∗, t)) (28)
Given an observed earnings in post-schooling year t (denoted It), the density
of post-schooling earnings, L2t, is
L2t =
MX
m=1
P ∗m · φ(
IWt − µm
σm
) (29)
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The contribution to the likelihood of the full earnings vector{IW89 , I
W
89 ....I
W
02 }
, L2 , is
L2 = L2,89 · L2,92 · ......L2,02
while the total likelihood is given by
L(.) =
6X
n=1
[L1(. | type n) · L2(. | type n)].Pr(type n) (30)
The parameters are obtained by maximizing the logarithm of the product of
each individual specific likelihood functions.
8 Results: Parameter Estimates
In order to estimate the model, I have separated the individuals in two co-
horts. The youngest cohort is made of all those individuals born in or after
1956. The second cohort is comprised of those born between 1945 and 1955.
The model has been estimated on both cohorts, although I only report the
results obtained for Italian Head of households born after 1956.29 In to-
tal, the model requires the estimation of around 140 free parameters. As is
usually the case in structural dynamic models, not all parameter estimates
raise a direct interest. For this reason, I report them in Appendix 4. They
are presented in the following blocks; objective type probabilities, earnings
shocks distribution (mixture of normals), utility shocks (mixture of normals),
market earnings, earnings in school, subjective beliefs, future component het-
erogeneity, and future component (risk aversion and parents’ background).
In the presentation, I shall focus my attention on the parameter estimates
of the subjective and the objective ability distribution, but as I go along, I will
occasionally refer to particular parameter estimates reported in Appendix 4.
Most tables that will be discussed below are devoted to particular quantities
implied by the parameters of the model.
29I do this because mostly because the results are very similar, and partly because the
presentation of a diﬀerent set of results would be cimbersome.
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9 Present and the Future Components of the
Intertemporal Utilities
In Table 1A, I report the average present and future utilities (in diﬀerences)
for each type. Schooling decisions are partly based upon the actual taste
for schooling but also on the subjective distribution of market abilities. As
we move from on type to the next, actual (objective) abilities change at the
same time as do subjective ability distributions. For this reason, the link
between schooling and specific type identity is diﬃcult to evaluate, and is
not as limpid as it would be in a more standard case.30
However, the type specific utilities may turn out to be very useful in order
to comprehend the inherent importance that agents attach to the future (as
opposed to the present). In standard structural dynamic models, the diﬀer-
ence between the present and the future components of the intertemporal
utilities is largely conditioned by the value of the discount factor. In many
applications, it is set to a fix value (usually between 0.9 and 0.95). In other
cases, it may be estimated. For a given value of the discount factor, the para-
metric form of the utilities and their related random shocks translate into
corresponding value functions. In practice, this means that the incidence of
“present biased” behavior is hardly detectable.
In the present case, the explained part of he model is composed of three
independent components of the intertemporal utilities. The present compo-
nent of the choice determinant is the diﬀerence between per-period utilities
of school and work. However, the future component is freely estimated and
there is also an unexplained part that is represented by the stochastic utility
shock. Although the stochastic term is linked to the present component in
the model presentation, it could as well be interpreted as an element of the
future component. After all, the random shock represents an i.i.d. innova-
tion realized at the time of the decision. Attaching a particular meaning to
it is therefore an ad-hoc decision.31
The future components (reported for the diﬀerences in the utility of at-
30In the structural dynamic discrete choice literature (Keane and Wolpin, 1997), it
is common to illustrate the role of heterogeneity by presenting type specific schooling
decisions. Because agents are assumed to know their ability endowments, it is easy to
associate schooling/career profiles , to individual persistent taste for schooling.
31In Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004), the unexplained part of the model is interpreted
as an optimization error which occur when participants to a laboratory experiment attend
to solve a Bellman equation.
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tending junior high-school, senior high-school and higher education) appears
to be, by far, the dominant factor generating schooling decisions. More pre-
cisely, for all types, the diﬀerence in current utilities are close to 0 while
the diﬀerence in future utilities moves from large negative numbers at lower
schooling levels (between -14 to -23) to a large positive number. While the
type specific average values indicate a higher importance of the future com-
ponent, it is also important to very the degree of cross-sectional dispersion.
Recall that a higher value for the present or the future components indi-
cates a higher propensity to leave school since the component measures the
diﬀerence between the utility of work and the utility of school.
In Table 1B, I report the standard deviation of the present and future
components. The standard deviations reflect variations across types and also
take into account heterogeneity parents background. The numbers indicate
that the present component is not more dispersed than the future compo-
nent. At all grade levels, the degree of heterogeneity in the future component
exceeds the one corresponding to the present component. It also exceeds the
standard deviation of the random shocks (equal to 7.7 at all levels).
In recent years, several economists have questioned the foundation of
the standard time-consistent intertemporal model and, in particular, have
pointed out particular economic behaviors that are may be characterized by
“present bias”. To the extent that the results reported in Table 1A and 1B
indicate a predominance of future components in schooling decisions, they
seem to be supportive of the standard time consistent model.32
10 The Objective Distribution of Skill Het-
erogeneity
The objective distribution of ability heterogeneity is summarized in Table
3A. The population is composed of 17% of high ability individuals (for whom
θW is 15.56), of 49% of medium ability individuals (for whom θW is 9.65)
and of 34% of low ability individuals (for whom θW is 5.12). The objective
distribution is characterized by a variance equal to 12.50. At a later stage,
I will compare the importance of heterogeneity to the degree of ex-ante risk
perceived by individuals. At the same time, the population is composed of
32For a theoretical discussion of the foundations of Behavioral Economics, see Rubinstein
(2005).
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74% of individuals with high taste for schooling (for whom θS is 13.72) and
26% of individuals with low taste (-1.62).
The eﬀect of parents background variables on both school and market
abilities (the θS0s and the θW 0s) are also found in appendix. Consistent with
what has been reported in the structural literature, the eﬀect of parents’
background on the utility of attending school is much stronger than on the
earnings equation’s intercept. This is a standard result in the structural
literature on schooling and it does not require further discussion.
11 The Subjective Beliefs
In this section, I summarize the results that allow me to characterize the
subjective beliefs. I first analyze the relative incidence of over-estimation
and under-estimation (the measure of location of the subjective distribu-
tion). Then, I consider the notion of confidence (the measure of spread) and
quantify the degree of ex-ante risk.
11.1 Over or Under Estimation? Measuring Accuracy
The subjective distribution of labor market skills is reported in Table 3B.
In Table 3C, I report three important summary statistics that characterize
the subjective beliefs; the mean belief, the bias (as defined by the diﬀerence
between the mean belief and the true (objective) value), and the degree of
ex-ante risk as evaluated by the variance of the subjective distribution. Note
that a negative (positive) bias indicates the incidence of under-estimation
(over-estimation). To a certain extent, this allows me to investigate the
notion of “over-confidence”, which has appeared recently in the behavioral
economics. However, it is important to note that in the literature, it is
typically defined in a context where the variable (or the parameter) that
characterizes over-confidence is non-stochastic.33 As my approach is more
general because I distinguish between location and spread, I prefer to use the
term "over-estimation” (or under-estimation) when referring to the central
location parameter of the distribution of subjective beliefs. As will be clear
in the next section, when analyzing the spread of the distribution, I use the
33Indeed, over-confidence is usually defined in general terms without any specific detail.
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term “confidence”.34
As may be inferred from Table 3B and Table 3C, a substantial level of
heterogeneity characterizes subjective beliefs. For both the most able (type
1 and type 2) and the least able (type 5 and type 6) individuals, there exists
one type that are endowed with degenerate subjective beliefs that coincide
with their actual type. These are type 2 and type 5 individuals. For these
types of individuals, both the bias and the ex-ante risk are equal to 0.(see
Table 3C).35
Among the more able, under-estimation appears to be important. Indi-
viduals of type 1 attribute only a probability equal to 0.46 to their actual
type. The bias that characterize their beliefs (-3.60) is the highest among all
types. This high level of dispersion translates into a high degree of ex-ante
risk, which is equal to 12.57. Overall, type 1 individuals represent 65% of
the able individuals.
At the lower end, over-estimation appears to be minor when compared
to the degree of under-estimation for the more able, as type 6 individuals
appear to over-estimate their ability only by a slight margin. Their subjective
probability of being their actual type, 0.87, is reasonably close to 1 and drives
the bias at a value of 0.59 and the degree of ex-ante risk at 2.32.
Finally, in the medium ability range (type 3 and type 4 individuals),
both subjective distributions are characterized by a positive bias and there-
fore imply over-estimation. In the case of type 3 individuals, the subjective
probability assigned to the actual type, 0.87, implies only a modest bias
(0.04) but the almost equal probability assigned to the high ability and the
low ability values (0.06 and .07) implies a relatively important level of risk
(3.53). Both over-estimation and ex-ante risk are more important among
type 4 individuals. The bias (1.89) is the second highest in absolute value,
while the variance of the subjective distribution (7.60) is also the second
highest.
Overall, when considering types as separate sub-populations, over-estimation
(or over-confidence) appears to me more frequent than under-estimation
(under-confidence). However, the degree of under-estimation found among
the more able is much more severe (in absolute value) than the degree of
34Arguably, the term “over-confidence” used in the behavioral economics literature is
somewhat misleading since it conveys a notion of ex-ante risk.
35The reader should note that the restriction on the mode of the subjective distribution
implies that, in a case of degenerate beliefs, there cannot be any bias. In words, this rules
out the case where an agent is certain of his type, but is actually wrong about it.
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over-estimation found among the medium and the low ability spectra.
11.2 Ex-Ante Risk: Measuring the Degree of Confi-
dence
As reported in Table 3A, the variance of the objective ability distribution
(as perceived by the econometrician) is relatively high (12.50). When av-
eraged over all types, the level of ex-ante risk (as measured by the average
variance over each subjective ability distribution) is equal to 3.81. Defin-
ing the degree of confidence of the agent as the ratio of the variance of the
objective distribution (as perceived by the econometrician) to the variance
of the subjective distribution, would lead to a degree approximately equal
to 4. In other words, only 25% of unobserved ability heterogeneity is actu-
ally perceived as ex-ante risk. Given the relatively accurate characterization
of their own ability (as indicated by the low average bias), these number
therefore imply that agents have a substantial amount of inside information,
when compared to the econometrician (they are four times more informed).
Indeed, as seen earlier, the type specific analysis revealed that around 36% of
the population act on the basis of a degenerate subjective ability distribution.
11.3 Accuracy, Confidence and ObjectiveMarket Abil-
ity.
Given the importance of heterogeneity that characterizes the subjective be-
liefs, it would be important to relate both a measure of accuracy (the absolute
value of the bias or the bias squared) and a measure of ex-ante risk (the vari-
ance of the type specific subjective distributions) to actual market ability.
This may be achieved informally. A quick inspection of Table 3C reveals
that both the incidence of a large bias and a high degree of dispersion are
confined to high ability individuals, and to a lesser extent, the medium ability
types. Those endowed with low ability appear to have an accurate depiction
of their true ability.36
36This may be verified formally. To do so, I performed an ordinary regression of both
the bias squared and the ex-ante risk on the actual heterogeneity component (school and
market abilities). The regressions indicate that both the level ex-ante risk and the degree
of inaccuracy is increasing with market ability.
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Obviously, this does not necessarily indicate that the more able are less
capable to form accurate beliefs than the less able. In a rigid labor market,
characterized by the presence of minimum wages and income support policies
for the disadvantaged, the wage distribution is more likely truncated from
below. It is therefore reasonable to expect low wage workers to use a relatively
accurate distribution of their potential wages. For the more able individuals,
wages are intrinsically more variable.
12 A Summary of the Major Findings
In this section, I summarize 6 major findings.
1. At all grade levels, both the average values and the degree of disper-
sion of the future component of the intertemporal utilities exceed the
equivalent measure for the present component. The predominance of
future components in schooling decisions, seem to be supportive of the
standard time consistent model. However, at the same time, idiosyn-
cratic utility shocks appear to be an important determinant of schooling
decisions.
2. These is a high degree of heterogeneity in subjective beliefs, but it is
explained mostly by the importance of heterogeneity in the objective
ability distribution (identified from panel data). Subjective beliefs are
found to be quite accurate on average (within-type dispersion is small).
3. Precisely, 36% of the population is found to take decisions based on a
degenerate ability distribution.
4. I find a strong incidence of under-estimation among the more able but a
small incidence of over-estimation among the low ability group. At the
medium ability spectrum, there is evidence of some over-estimation.
5. Defining the degree of confidence as the ratio of the variance of the ob-
jective distribution (as perceived by the econometrician) to the variance
of the subjective distribution, would lead to a degree approximately
equal to 4. In other words, only 25% of unobserved ability heterogene-
ity is actually perceived as ex-ante risk. The degree of confidence is high
and imply that agents have a substantial amount of inside information.
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6. Both the level of ex-ante risk (the degree of non-confidence) and the
degree of inaccuracy (the incidence of either under-estimation or over-
estimation) are increasing with market ability.
13 Conclusion Remarks
As far as I know, this paper is the first attempt to obtain micro-econometric
estimates of subjective beliefs in a context where the econometrician has no
access to such direct measures. While using elicited beliefs would always
be the preferred strategy, it is important to note that such data are rarely
available. For this reason, I believe that this approach is promising.
In line with the recent creation of data sets that incorporate various mea-
surements on psychometric and/or risk attitude questions, it would be inter-
esting to use factor analysis in order to investigate deeper issues regarding
subjective risk evaluation and risk aversion.37
Evidently, the structure of the models could also be modified in various
ways. As I have focussed on schooling decisions at the detriment of post
schooling choices, and used data on post schooling earnings, the model im-
plicitly disallows individuals to take actions to correct their mistakes. It
would therefore be interesting to endogenize post schooling earnings growth.
Finally, this approach could also be applied in a treatment eﬀect hetero-
geneity framework so to model the incidence of over-education (or under-
education). It could equally be applied to model the duration of unemploy-
ment, or job search behavior.
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Table 1A
The average Present and Future components
of the Intertemporal utilities
Average Components
j =Elementary j =Junior HS j =Senior HS
Present Future Present Future Present Future
P (j) z(j) P (j) z(j) P (j) z(j)
type 1 (θSH , θ
W
H ) -0.01 -13.3 0.06 -3.62 0.15 9.43
type 2 (θSL, θ
W
H ) 0.2 -14.7 1.0 16.8 0.74 -7.05
type 3 (θSH , θ
W
M ) -0.4 -14.4 -0.3 3.91 -0.2 9.24
type 4 (θSL, θ
W
M ) 0.1 -15.4 0.9 -6.8 0.8 4.1
type 5 (θSH , θ
W
L ) 0.1 -23.5 0.2 -3.6 0.3 11.2
type 6 (θSL, θ
W
L ) 0.6 -19.4 1.4 -10.1 1.6 11.9
average over types 0.1 -17.4 0.3 -0.7 0.5 8.2
Note: The present (P (j)) and future (z(j)) are defined as the diﬀerence
in per-period utilities of school and work and the diﬀerence in future utili-
ties of school and work for those who have already completed level j. The
components reported are for the transition from elementary to junior high
school, junior high school to senior high school, and senior high school to
higher education.
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Table 1B
The Relative Importance of the
Present and the Future Components
Standard Deviations
j =elementary j =Junior HS j =Senior HS
Present
P (j) 1.7 1.9 5.3
Future 16.4 8.4 6.2
z(j)
utility shocks 7.7 7.7 7.7
εSit(j)
Note: The standard deviations represent the dispersion in the present
(P (j)) and future (z(j)) components across all types.
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Table 1C
The Type specific grade termination rates
Fraction Leaving School
j =Elementary j =Junior HS j =Senior HS
type 1 (θSH , θ
W
H ) 0.42 0.67 0.97
type 2 (θSL, θ
W
H ) 0.24 0.98 0.32
type 3 (θSH , θ
W
M ) 0.27 0.87 0.97
type 4 (θSL, θ
W
M ) 0.21 0.47 0.92
type 5 (θSH , θ
W
L ) 0.00 0.70 0.98
type 6 (θSL, θ
W
L ) 0.08 0.33 0.98
average 0.18 0.72 0.92
Actual 0.23 0.79 0.91
Note: The grade termination (hazard) rates should be understood as the
conditional probability of leaving school with a particular grade level already
completed
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Table 2
Risk Aversion: Summary Statistics
Risk Aversion
Average 0.14
Min -0.13
Max 0.18
St. dev 0.02
fraction risk averse 0.98.
Note: the estimates of the risk aversion parameter are obtained from the
solution of the expected utility equation corresponding to the lottery.
Table 3A
Skill Heterogeneity
The Objective Distribution of Market Ability
θS θW type Prob.
type 1 13.7248 15.5604 0.11
type 2 -1.6169 15.5604 0.06
type 3 13.7248 9.6504 0.33
type 4 -1.6169 9.6504 0.16
type 5 13.7248 5.1204 0.30
type 6 -1.6169 5.1204 0.04
Mean 10.42 9.25 -
Variance 63.24 12.50 -
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Table 3B
Subjective Beliefs:
The type specific subjective probability distributions
Actual Potential
Type Type
School ab Market. ab High Medium Low
θ˜
W
i =15.56 θ˜
W
i =9.65 θ˜
W
i =5.12
.
type 1 High High 0.46 0.45 0.09
type 2 Low High 1.00 0.00 0.00
type 3 High Medium 0.06 0.87 0.07
type 4 Low Medium 0.32 0.68 0.00
type 5 High Low 0.00 0.00 1.00
type 6 Low Low 0.00 0.13 0.87
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Table 3C
Mean, Bias and Ex-ante risk characterizing the Subjectibve
Beliefs
Mean Actual value Bias Risk (variance)
type 1 (θSH , θ
W
H ) 11.96 15.5604 -3.60 12.57
type 2 (θSL, θ
W
H ) 15.56 15.5604 0.00 0.00
type 3 (θSH , θ
W
M ) 9.69 9.6504 0.04 3.53
type 4 (θSL, θ
W
M ) 11.54 9.6504 1.89 7.60
type 5 (θSH , θ
W
L ) 5.12 5.1204 0.00 0.00
type 6 (θSL, θ
W
L ) 5.71 5.1204 0.59 2.32
Average over types 9.08 9.25 - 3.81
Note: The type specific bias is the diﬀerence between the type specific
mean belief and the true (objective) value). A negative (positive) bias indi-
cates the incidence of under-estimation (over-estimation).
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Appendix 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
bet (in 000 liras) 2513.083 4798.066 1 100000
edu1 (graduate) 0.005 - 0 1
edu2 (universirty) 0.099 - 0 1
edu3 (senior high school) 0.461 - 0 1
edu4 (junior high school) 0.392 - 0 1
edu5 (elementary) 0.038 - 0 1
edu6 (no educ) 0.005 - 0 1
edu_father 0.127 - 0 1
edu_mother 0.088 - 0 1
north 0.406 - 0 1
south 0.423 - 0 1
female 0.179 - 0 1
wc_father 0.250 - 0 1
wc_mother 0.101 - 0 1
age (in 1995) 32.45 3.91 20 38
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Appendix 2
Yearly Earnings Data
mean St. Dev. Min Max
year
1989 16551 5577 2205 40847
1991 17015 8936 1807 216889
1993 17193 8094 592 72472
1995 16118 7631 421 78217
1998 16735 7811 507 84504
2000 17186 7795 272 68062
2002 17037 8361 1000 100000
Note: Yearly Earnings are measured in 2002 euros. The numbers include
all cohorts.
39
Appendix 3
Further parameterization
Objective type probabilities:
Pr(type n) =
exp(ωn)
1 + exp(ω1) + ... exp(ω5)
Earnings random shocks (normal mixtures):
PWm =
exp(pW∗m )
1 + exp(pW∗1 ) + exp(p
W∗
2 )
for m = 1, 2 and pW∗3 = 0
µW1 = − exp(µS∗1 ), µW2 = 0, µW3 = exp(µS∗3 )
σSm = exp(σ
W∗
m )
Utility Shocks (normal mixtures):
P Sm =
exp(pS∗m )
1 + exp(pS∗1 ) + exp(p
S∗
2 )
for m = 1, 2 and pS∗3 = 0
µS1 = − exp(µS∗1 ), µS2 = 0, µS3 = exp(µS∗3 )
σSm = 1 for m = 1, 2, 3
Parents’ background/market abilities:
θW1 = exp(θ
W∗
1 ), θ
W
2 = exp(θ
W∗
2 ), θ
W
3 = exp(θ
W∗
3 ), θ
W
4 = exp(θ
W∗
4 )
parents’ background/school abilities:
θS1 = exp(θ
S∗
1 ), θ
S
2 = exp(θ
S∗
2 ), θ
S
3 = exp(θ
S∗
3 ), θ
S
4 = exp(θ
S∗
4 )
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Future component:
z2j = − exp(z∗2j),z3j = − exp(z∗3j),z4j = − exp(z∗4j),z5j = − exp(z∗5j)∀j
Subjective Beliefs:
type 1/type 2
µ1,2H = exp(µ
1,2
1 ) + exp(µ
1,2
2 ), µ
1,2
M = exp(µ
1,2
2 ), µ
1,2
L = 0
Subjective Beliefs:
type 3/type 4
µ3,4H = exp(µ
3,4
1 ), µ
3,4
M = exp(µ
3,4
1 ) + exp(µ
3,4
2 ), µ
3,4
L = 0
or
µ3,4H = 0, µ
3,4
M = exp(µ
3,4
2 ) + exp(µ
3,4
3 ), µ
3,4
L = exp(µ
3,4
3 )
Subjective Beliefs:
type 5/type 6
µ5,6H = 0, µ
5,6
M = exp(µ
5,6
2 ), µ
5,6
L = exp(µ
5,6
2 ) + exp(µ
5,6
3 )
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Appendix 4
Structural Estimates
estimate st-error
Type prob.
ω1 0.5411 1.52
ω2 0.3259 1.30
ω3 2.1311 8.35
ω4 0.5598 1.91
ω5 1.8588 6.18
ω6 - -
earnings shock
pW∗1 3.4441 0.13
pW∗2 2.6870 0.16
pW∗3 0.00 -
µW∗1 -9.5008 0.21
µW∗2 - -
µW∗3 0.3710 0.47
σW∗m -0.1073 0.20
σW∗m 0.9387 0.21
σW∗m -15.5809 0.65
Utility shocks
pW∗1 -0.9025 0.38
pW∗1 2.2243 0.12
pW∗1 - -
µS∗1 1.7120 0.15
µS∗1 - -
µS∗1 3.0763 0.08
σS∗1 - -
σS∗2 - -
σS∗3 - -
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Appendix 4 (continued)
estimate st-error
Market Earnings
θ˜
W
H 15.4604 0.31
θ˜
W
M 9.6504 0.26
θ˜
W
L 5.1204 0.29
ςuniv 8.3444 0.38
ςu.H.S. 6.5436 0.25
ςu.L.S. 1.3004 0.22
ςelem 0.00 -
experience 11.7200 0.69
experience2 -3.9448 0.22
θW1 (FED) -5.9525 0.21
θW2 (MED) -10.8193 0.22
θW3 (FWC) -7.8566 0.20
θW4 (MWC) -7.4735 0.19
θW5 (female) -3.6078 0.28
θW6 (North) 0.3950 0.18
θW7 (South) -1.3824 0.19
earnings in school
θ˜
S
H 13.7248 0.25
θ˜
S
L -1.6169 0.22
ζSuniv -0.0889 0.20
ζSU.H.S -1.1805 0.30
ζSL.H.S 6.2336 1.41
ζSelem - -
θS1 (FED) -1.6710 0.22
θS1 (MED) 1.7110 0.19
θS1 (FWC) -4.9025 0.22
θS1 (MWC) -3.4981 0.22
θS1 (female) -5.4962 0.54
θS1 (North) 8.6653 0.53
θS1 (South) -1.2457 0.72
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Appendix 4 (continued)
estimate st.error
Subj beliefs
type 1
µ11 -2.6024 0.81
µ12 -5.2051 1.31
µ13 0.0000 -
type 2
µ21 1.5132 0.31
µ22 -1.0272 0.27
µ23 -0.1073 -
type 3
µ31 1.3763 0.22
µ32 1.8312 0.22
µ33 0 -
type 4
µ41 0.2371 0.24
µ42 1.4390 0.39
µ42 0 -
type 5
µ51 0 -
µ52 -0.1526 0.24
µ53 2.7275 0.50
type 6
µ61 0 -
µ6 3.5198 0.92
µ61 -3.0832 0.80
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Appendix 4 (continued)
estimate st. error
Future comp.
heterogenity (z0klj)
z0HH1 -14.4515 0.53
z0LH1 -10.2853 0.46
z0HM1 -9.8577 0.58
z0LM1 -14.8952 0.87
z0HL1 -7.4294 0.91
z0LL1 -9.1069 0.57
z0HH2 -3.8859 0.47
z0LH2 -3.8189 0.37
z0HM2 -16.0533 0.35
z0LM2 -4.6045 0.38
z0HL2 -9.3889 0.59
z0LL2 -10.8507 0.72
z0HH3 -9.4381 0.93
z0LH3 7.1000 0.86
z0HM3 -1.6309 0.64
z0LM3 21.0022 0.43
z0HL3 -12.6764 0.29
z0LL3 -5.2139 0.21
z0HH4 6.7245 0.22
z0LH4 5.4495 0.48
z0HM4 12.4105 0.36
z0LM4 -5.2858 0.37
z0HL4 10.5117 0.74
z0LL4 11.1104 0.67
z0HH5 11.9737 0.66
z0LH5 23.3494 0.62
z0HM5 22.7861 0.37
z0LM5 20.8798 0.34
z0HL5 23.0335 0.38
z0LL5 17.4454 0.40
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Appendix 4 (continued)
estimate st. error
future component
(risk aversion &
parents’ background)
z11(αi) -1.8112 0.22
z21(FED) 3.2393 0.32
z31(MED) 0.7484 0.13
z41(FWC) 2.7521 0.20
z51(MWC) 0.8819 0.18
z12(αi) -1.8146 0.66
z22(FED) 2.4683 0.25
z32(MED) 2.6411 0.34
z42(FWC) 2.8356 0.33
z52(FWC) 2.7586 0.25
z13(αi) -4.7483 0.66
z23(FED) 2.2273 0.43
z33(MED) 1.2871 0.33
z43(FWC) 1.1604 0.38
z53(MWC) 1.8164 0.29
z14(αi) -1.1640 0.15
z24(FED) 1.6738 0.27
z34(MED) 1.1331 0.34
z44(FWC) 1.2897 0.24
z54(MWC) -3.8955 0.22
z15(αi) 0.0353 0.20
z25(FED) -4.0968 0.22
z35(MED) -4.3264 0.26
z45(FWC) -3.9703 0.30
z55(MWC) -3.4445 0.30
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